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Law, Life and Letters. By the Earl of Birkenhead. Newr York, George
H. Doran Co., 1927. Vol. I, pp. 296. Vol. II, pp. 326.
Legal subjects occupy about half of the two volumes of this work. In-
terspersed among them, in a rather haphazard fashion, -re chapters on
such topics, among others, as Stray Thoughts on Letter-Writing, The
Works and Life of Sir Walter Scott, Eighteenth Brumaire, The Truth
About Margot Asquith. The opening chapter deals legalistically with the
recent libel suit of Captain Wright against Lord Gladstone. The latter
published prima facie libellous statements concerning Captain Wright, in
order to invite a suit for libel in which he might be enabled to disprove
calumnious statements made by Wright concerning Lord Gladstone's father,
the eminent statesman. Cases rarely occur where statements concerning
the dead afford the basis of a suit for damages by descendants. There is
a dictur, of Justice Stephen that a libel on a dead person is not a mis-
demeanor "unless it is intended to injure or provoke living persons"; but
Lord Birkenhead quite pertinently, it seems to me, remarks that not the
intention but the natural consequences of the language used, should de-
termine whether it is calculated to cause a breach of the peace,-the ul-
timate test. In the interest of history, the public becomes, in course of time,
entitled to comment upon the notable dead, without fear of reprisal. Lord
Birkenhead could not, for instance, imagine Judge Jeffreys' descendants
bringing an action against a modern biographer for maligning the character
of their ancestor. But attacks on a dead father, and perhaps on a grand-
father, would naturally cause "warm" and "reasonable" resentment which
might be expected to find vent in violence. Juries in judging cases ought to
"consider themselves as dealing with normal, sensible living persons and not
with descendants abnormal, hypersensitive, or more vindictive than the
common run." But does this connotation take account of such normal
sentiments as family pride, affection, gratitude and hereditary traditions
of moral conduct? Probably not; and the manifold and varying reactions
of normal persons to attacks upon the fair fame of their forebears are
hard to forecast.
The chapter on this subject is extended to animadvert upon the ques-
tionable practice of Lady Oxford in quoting discussions with persons of
distinction no longer living, in which the "vivacious and undefeated Lady
seldom comes off second best"; the pernicious habit of modern novelists,
particularly Arnold Bennett, of bringing into his stories "under a thin
disguise * * * circumstances of disparagement" relating to one "who is
alive or recently dead, in a matter which was never proved against him in
his lifetime"; the habit of Mr. Wells in his comments upon public matters,
of foisting upon reviewers and the public "tiresome pamphlets * * * in
the guise of romances" and putting forth so-called literature which is "tire-
some, dull, sterile and uninteresting"; and the recent growth of semi-
scandalous volumes of memoirs like Lady Cardigan's notorious volume, the
Memoirs of Harriette Wilson and the Whispering Gallery. But the author
suggests no remedy through the law for these abuses.
In commenting on the increase in the cost of legal proceedings, Lord
Birkenhead says that it "is a very important element in the falling off of
litigation, of which the bar today so bitterly complains." It will strike
the American public as strange that just complaint can be made by anyone
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of a decrease of litigation, when the congestion of business in our courts
is already causing such delay as to amount to a denial of justice. In our
great cities, such congestion is due largely to so-called negligence suits,
which constitute nearly 75% of jury cases; and one reason that these are
so numerous is that under the contingent fee system plaintiffs are put to
no expense; nor is the cost of the defense a deterrent because that is mini-
mized by the fact that corporations or indemnity companies (who are us-
ually the defendants) employ a staff of salaried trial counsel. In Eng-
land the contingent fee is illegal and the unsuccessful party must pay the
costs not only of his own solicitor and counsel, but often those of the other
side. Lord Birkenhead does not very successfully defend the enormous
increase in England of the cost of litigation; and he is on quite indefens-
ible ground when he implies that it is a source of regret that "litigants
will prefer to make a reasonable compromise, rather than embark upon
these perilous financial waters." More and more in this country have com-
promises been encouraged by the courts, which frequently act as mediators;
arbitration out of court has grown in favor; and if by such means litiga-
tion should decrease, all classes of the community would rejoice, even
though it should cause complaints from some members of our already over-
crowded bar.
The distinguished author comments upon the change in the procedure in
England by which a defendant charged with crime is permitted to testify
in his own behalf. The judge there, but not counsel, may comment upon
such failure. In New York and other states in this country, neither coun-
sel nor the court may make such comment. In England counsel for the
defense "will hardly ever take the responsibility of advising a prisoner not
to give evidence." But in this country it is not uncommon for counsel to
give such advice, especially where he is of opinion that the state has not
made out a case; and sometimes that course is advised ag affording the
only chance of escaping conviction. But defendants who decline to testify
are generally convicted.
Lord Birkenhead's practice was exclusively as a barrister. lie asserts
that the tendency is "to exalt advocacy," because of the conspicuous and
attractive qualities which it requires and the traditional precedence which
it bestows. But he is solicitous lest the magnitude, complication and im-
portance of the work of solicitors may not be understood. In modern fi-
nancial, commercial and industrial affairs, and in the administration of great
estates, solicitors must be possessed of legal knowledge, constructive skill
and originality of conception; and intellectual superiority in such matters
is bound to bring rewards in money, reputation and social position, which
will naturally tend to remove the barriers which have existed between the
two branches of the profession. The a priori arguments of Lord Birken-
head against the removal of those barriers, are not convincing, though it
is not difficult to appreciate his sentimental attachment to a system under
which he has achieved rare distinction. But a nation which has a genius
for legal concepts, and which has had the spirit and hardihood to eman-
cipate itself from the anomalous intricacies and recondite lore of the law
of estates and property, and to reform the organization of its courts and
their procedure, -will not forever tolerate, without substantial modification,
a professional system which preserves the preeminence of one branch of
the profession, whose fame rests on "litigious terms, fat contentions and
flowing fees," over the other which occupies itself with constructive effort.
Lord Birkenhead points out that death has played a part in eliminating
professional distinctions, for there died not long since "the last Sergeant-
at-Law" and "the last Advocate, the last Conveyancer, and the last Special
Pleader practicing under the Bar"; and he might have added in this con-
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nection as he did in another, that when the great law reformers of the
Nineteenth Century had a clean slate on which to write and created the
county courts (probably the most important tribunals in England for the
mass of the people) and reorganized the court of the Justices of the Peace,
they provided that "in those courts barristers and solicitors co-exist as
advocates, neither branch having any peculiar privileges in those courts
as against one another." There is reason also to believe that in ordinary
practice privileges based on the tradition referred to are frequently ignored.
Thus, where an opinion of counsel is sought upon a written statement pre-
pared by a solicitor, the restriction that the former may not make a supple-
mentary or independent investigation of facts, has been long since in prac-
tice relaxed; and a barrister may also, in preparing important and compli-
cated cases, himself sometimes interview the client and his principal wit-
nesses.
The cumulative effect of such encroachments as these will in time leave
nothing but the shell of an antiquated and once respected system, and then
the process of sweeping it away will be simple. The tendency of English
people to make their law and its administration expand or contract accord-
ing to the requirements of changing social and business life and the needs
of a developing civilization, makes it probable that this change will ulti-
mately come.
Much that the learned author says in the chapter on the Breach of
Promise of Marriage will have interest to lawyers. Action based upon such
a breach seems to be more frequent in the English courts than in ours.
There is an indisposition on the part of American women, particularly
those of social position, to expose their private affairs to the public gaze.
A respectable body of opinion in England favors the abolition of the action
there, principally because it is such a fruitful source of blacknail. The
author, however, sustains his view of the justice of the cause of action
with warmth born of conviction, and his conclusions are based upon a far
more extended experience than leaders of the bar in this country usually
have.
Lord Birkenhead displays the most intense interest in the subject of
divorce law reform, which occupies nearly fifty pages of his first volume.
He denounces the law as "barbarous," and he contrasts it with the law of
America where divorces "are adjusted more easily, less publicly, and less
scandalously," although admitting that in some localities
"the rules of divorce are almost as unaccommodating as with us " a
the matter is not desperate, for, unless I am misinformed, a domicile can
be procured in a less difficult state which will resolve the conjugal problems
of a severer domicile."
Most people in America will not agree with Lord Birkenhead in his
optimism as to the divorce situation here. Indeed, it is the general opinion
that we have a divorce problem of our own in this country which is the
cause of recurrent scandals and almost continuous efforts at reform. The
situation in England was recently referred to by an English judge thus:
"Many of these cases are perfect farces, and the legislature had much
better let these people go before a Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths and record the fact that they no longer desire to be married. * * *
Quite half of these cases are collusive, but that is not always a reason, in
my view, for refusing relief to an injured spouse. Indeed, half the peti-




And a correspondent of Truth says that "the game is so well known that,
in polite circles in which it is played, his confession has acquired the nolo
espiscopari flavour, and no one pays any attention to it."
The Royal Commission which sat for three years before the war, made
radical recommendations which, however, have never been agreed to by
Parliament. The author's argument in favor of the recommendations of
the Commission is sustained, vigorous and forceful. While admitting that
certain "additional reasons formerly required" before a divorce could be
granted on the ground of adultery, have been removed, and the lessening
of the expense of divorce proceedings has enabled married people of moder-
ate means to avail themselves of the law as they could not before, never-
theless, Lord Birkenhead believes that no thorough reform can be obtained
until divorces can be granted upon five additional grounds recommended
as a sufficient cause by the Commission, which are as follows:
1. Wilful desertion Tor three years;
2. Cruelty;
3. Incurable lunacy of five years' standing;
4. Habitual drunkenness; and
5. Imprisonment under a commuted death-sentence.
He attributes the defeat of the bill to accomplish this reform largely to
the Bishops of the Church of England, and he is by no means content to
rest with the reasons which impelled them to oppose it. With a trace of
asperity he refers to them thus:
"Their mental position is a curious one. They are not legislating for
their own flock. * * * No member of the Church of England need sue
for a divorce nor need re-marry if divorced. All that the Bishops and their
lay retainers in the Houses are doing is to compel other people to live up
to standards which they do not accept. * * * They are merely en-
couraging the poor to disregard the marriage tie and the rich to laugh at
the law."
Lord Birkenhead's lengthy justification of the activities of the Xing's
Proctor will suggest to the American lawyer that the precautions of the
English system to prevent collusion in divorce actions, are probably more
effective than those prevailing in this country, where they are largely
dependent-upon the ability and experience of the trial judge. The neces-
sity for such precaution in this country is indicated by the frequency with
which we hear of one spouse "giving" the other a divorce.
Sir Hall Caine recently resuscitated the old question whether the law
courts are cruel, and Lord Birkenhead comes forward in defense with
arguments rather trite to lawyers. On the question whether an advocate
should defend a client whom he knows to be guilty, he confronts Sir Hall
with the somewhat hackneyed statement of Dr. Johnson, that "the advo-
cate is not to usurp the function of the judge." We may infer from this
argument that the learned ex-Chancellor attributes the abuses of cross-
examination to the differing temperaments and variable practices of trial
judges; for, contrasting the conduct of one "able and experienced judge"
in a famous case, who admitted questions, seventy per cent of which were
"irrelevant, offensive and almost unprofessional," with that of another
who in an equally well-known case, announced "In this case I shall not
exclude any evidence," he advocates as a cure for such legal medleys a
more stritbt observance of "binding and intelligible rules which are an
indispensable element of the law of the land."
Closely connected with this subject is the nature and extent of the power
of the judge in influencing the jury. Though "judges are responsible for
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matters of law; jurymen are responsible for matters of fact," a very
different conception of the function of the judge from that prevailing in
England, has grown up in this country. In an extreme expression it is
embodied in pending legislation in Congress (the Caraway bill), which
would make a trial judge a mere moderator or automaton through whom
propositions of law would be austerely announced to the jury, with no
assistance from concrete illustration or illuminating comment, lest come
incautious remark might disclose to the jury what the judge's individual
opinion might be, and thus lead it to abdicate its right to reason for itself.
That such practice would be at variance with the historical theory of jury
trials under the common law, Lord Birkenhead makes plain:
"The judge is perfectly entitled to make plain to the jury the way in
which his own mind is working. The judge, in other words, is perfectly
entitled to attempt to impress upon the jury the view which he has himself
formed of the facts of the case.
The skill of judges at nisi pnius may very often be measured by the
tact by which they manage their juries. If a judge has formed a strong
view upon the facts of the case, he naturally desires that it shall prevail
and the stronger the judge, the more concerned he is that his view shall
be reflected in the conclusion."
If the learned author were sitting at nisi prius, he would be guided thus:
"I should as tactfully and persuasively as I could, insinuate my views
into the minds of the jury, while contriving to avoid the criticism that I
was overbearing them in what was their function and not mine. But I
should, nevertheless, loyally recognize the reality of their function and the
separation between it and mine."
These quotations will evoke from an American lawyer a vigorous dissent
from Lord Birkenhead's statement that such procedure in the English
courts has "been largely, if not completely, reproduced in the United States
of America."
Milestones of My Life is a chapter containing a brief autobiography of
the author and is of engaging interest. It illustrates that the highest dis-
tinction in the legal profession is open to the English youth of intellectual
capacity with other elements of success, even though without the adventi-
tious advantage of birth, wealth or favoritism. As to a barrister entering
public life, he concludes:
"Unless, therefore, the rising barrister whom we are attempting to ad-
vise, has given some distinct evidence of political, as distinguished from
forensic, capacity, he will on the whole be well advised to write politics
off the slate of his life; nor does such decision deny to him a very distin-
guished career. He may, if he be among the elect, become a judge of the
High Court; thence he may be promoted to be a Lord Justice of Appeals;
if he be one of the foremost men in his legal generation, he may even be-
come a Law Lord and a life Peer, so that even for the non-political bar-
rister, if he be a real winner in the legal Derby, a career of extraordinary
distinction is open. He may live to make the laws of England, even to
administer justice in the far-flung and complex jurisprudence of the British
Empire, in virtue of membership of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council."
A member of Parliament may more easily continue in the profitable
practice in England than in this country. Many English barristers either
live in London or have litigated business there, and it is thus easy to con-
tinue their professional activities there; and it is expected that they will.
In this country the centers of governmental activities, both executive and
legislative, are usually geographically at a distance. The lawyer who stays
at home can more conveniently and effectively care for the clients' interests,
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than his political brother who seeks at a distance distinction in the fascinat-
ing field of political life. Furthermore, more frequently than in America,
judicial distinction is achieved in England through political channels, for,
as Lord Birkenhead remarks on this point:
"And it is, of course, not less apparent that the most dazzling prizes
of the profession fall to those who have proved alike their political and-their
legal efficiency. Except by strange and infrequently recurring chances no
man becomes Lord High Chancellor who has not sat in the House of dom-
mons. The Lord Chief Justice of England, except by the same kind of
accident, is always one who has passed through the Parliamentary hurly-
burly, and the law officers of the Crown, with all the dazzling possibilities
which their offices afford, must from the very nature of their duties, find
seats in the House of Commons.
It may, therefore, be confidently predicted that the lure of Parliament
will always make an irresistible appeal to the most adventurous and gifted
members of the legal profession."
What Lord Birkenhead says of the pecuniary rewards of his own practice
is interesting:
"In my first year I made £120; in the second year £1200; in my third
year £3100; in my fourth year £4200; in my fifth year £5150; and in my
sixth year just over £6000. These figures in pre-war days and with no real
taxation to pay, were very substantial, and I should doubt whether within
so short a period of time they have been exceeded by anyone who com-
menced his legal life without the slightest real influence behind him."
After Lord Birkenhead had declined the offer of Mr. Lloyd George to
appoint him Attorney General, because the office did not give him a seat
in the Cabinet, he accepted the elevation to the woolsack. He estimated
that he thus sacrificed a prospective professional income of £20,000 a year.
On retirement he had only to look forward to a pension of £5,000 a year.
But the force of tradition decrees that one who has been Lord, Chancellor
shall never capitalize his eminence by practicing as a barrister. Accord-
ingly, we find ex-Lord Chancellors eking out the meagre pension of $25,000
a year in various ways, and in the case of Lord Birkenhead (when not in
office,- as he is at present), engaging in pursuits (in his case literary),
which, we may hope, are profitable. The decision to become Lord Chancellor
is, as the author remarks
"an immensely grave one for any man who has the capacity for earning
one of the great incomes of the bar, and who has established a considerable
position in the House of Commons. Mrs. Brougham wrote to her son
Henry, bitterly remonstrating with him when he accepted the woolsack.
The genius of Erskine lingered only as a pale memory when once he passed
to the cold shades of the Upper House. The salary of Lord Chancellor is
indeed £10,000 a year; but he is involved in much ceremonial expenditure,
so that in these days of high taxation the emolument is relatively small,
and incommensurate with the dignity and greatness of the office."
Lord Birkenhead became Lord Chancellor at an age, as he assures us,
"younger than any save Jeffreys and Thurlow," and he approached the
performance of his duties "in a spirit of anxious solicitude; but not, be-
lieve me, in one of morbid self-distrust"
HENRY W. TAF.
Cases on Future Interests. By Richard R. Powell, assisted by Lewis M.
Simes. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1928. pp. xxviii, 968.
It may as well be said at the outset that this review is not written by
one who will have any occasion to test this case book in the class room.
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The reviewer's interest in this subject is both practical and theoretical;
practical, because his work has made it necessary to know something about
the law of future interests; theoretical, because the subject has been some-
what of a hobby to be pursued at odd leisure moments. Notwithstanding
the assumption of case book editors that their books will be used by no
one other than students in law schools, this reviewer has found the differ-
ent collections of property case books very convenient sources of reference.
It is not possible for the average practitioner to have easily available for
ready reference all the reported decisions. It is possible for him to have
the various collections of cases in the subject, or subjects, in which he is
especially interested.
It has always been a theory of the reviewer that real property law in
this country is largely a "local issue." Because of the many statutory
modifications, this is especially true of the subject of future intercsts. It
is therefore highly gratifying to find in this case book a very complete
citation of the various pertinent statutes. An especially commendable fea-
ture is the very complete table of statutes following the table of contents.
The first chapter of the book, Early Evolution of Future Interests, is
a very excellent summary of the absolutely essential historical material
that is necessary to an understanding of the subject of future interests.
This is followed by eighteen hypothetical cases to illustrate, as Prof. Powell
says, "the multiplicity of transactions out of which problems in the law of
future interests can arise." One of the purposes of this list of hypothe-
tical cases is to "stimulate discussion." And we fancy that the discussion
stimulated by some of the cases will be whether they state problems of
future interests at all. For instance case 17 concerning inchoate dower.
To this reviewer inchoate dower is a rather present nuisance than a future
interest. Case 10, involving the deposit of a deed in escrow, is an interest-
ing one, a case not usually thought of as creating a future interest. It
would seem to this reviewer that the skilful teacher can make use of the
hypothetical cases to give a general picture of the whole subject, before
plunging the student into the decided cases.
At first blush there is a seeming shortage of English cases, which to this
reviewer is not a fault, but a merit. When one has read almost one hun-
dred pages without encountering an English case one wakes up with a
start. "What! has an editor of a case book on future interests discovered
America?" This starts one on the statistics which reviewers of case books
seem to think essential. A count of cases shows that one's first impression
is wrong. Of the 211 cases in the book, 67 or almost one third are Eng-
lish. That Prof. Powell has sought to use only those English cases which
seem necessary to fill in the historical background is evidenced from the
preface where he says:
"Whether we like it or abhor it, nevertheless the law of the future inter-
ests now existent in the United States contains a high percentage of rules
and procedure understandable only in the light of history. In practice, a
lawyer can not take time to acquire this background in the investigation
of the law applicable to a particular case. Hence this book seeks to pre-
sent those early cases which show the origins of present practices and
constructions, -without a knowledge of which a student of this topic would
lack needed equipment."
He further states that he has not thought it necessary to try to find
cases other than those used by Gray and Kales to illustrate the historical
development of the subject.
While we are on this subject of statistics it may be said that after deduct-
ing the 67 English cases we have left 144 cases. These cases are taken from
the decisions of the courts in 29 American jurisdictions, including the
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federal courts and the courts of the District of Columbia. Of these 1,14
cases, 35 are from New York, 22 from Illinois, and 19 from Massachusetts.
It will thus be seen that 76 of the 144 American cases are taken from three
jurisdictions. Next to New York, Illinois and Massachusetts, come Now
Jersey with 9 and Pennsylvania with 6 cases. It will be noted that over
half the American cases are from three jurisdictions, and that nearly one
fourth of the American cases are from New York. Twenty-one American
jurisdictions are not represented by any cases. The disproportionately
large number of New York cases is doubtless due to the fact that most of
the editor's teaching experience has been gained in that state. All of which
is another instance of the fact that property law tends to become a "local
issue."
No editor can include all the cases, but if this reviewer were editing -t
case book on future interests he could not well exclude Smaw V. Young 1
which contains one of the best discussions of certain phases of future in-
terests that he has ever seen. It is rather surprising that this case es-
capes even the foot notes.
But to come back to the first hundred pages, which as stated above are
wholly American cases, many of them quite recent American cases. The
use of American cases at this stage seems to the reviewer to have the ad-
vantage of introducing the student to an extremely difficult subject through
the medium of language that is more easily understandable than the
ancient English cases; and the further advantage of showing the student
that the subject is of more than purely historical interest. Whether Biwcr
v. Martin 2 ought to be introduced so early in the game is an open question.
To this reviewer it seems one of those horrible examples of judicial "throw
back" which should be relegated to the foot notes.
The pedagogical value of the ingenious questions that Prof. Powell has
appended to each case is for the experienced case law teacher to settle for
himself. Our advice to any teacher contemplating the use of this book
would be to examine these questions pretty thoroughly. Otherwise his
bright pupils are going to give him some bad half hours. Incidentally it
might be said that question 6 (b) on page 276 has caused the reviewer
some practical trouble in Ohio. And he doesn't yet know the answer.
A highly commendable feature of the book is the emphasis on practical
questions, especially the chapter on statutory proceedings which minimize
the inalienability of future interests. This chapter deals with the various
statutes by which voluntarily inalienable interests may be disposed of by
judicial proceedings. In this connection attention is called to the Ohio
Statutes on page 453, which this reviewer happens to think might well
serve as a model for less progressive jurisdictions-New York for instance.
There is another practieal section on the question as to who are necessary
parties to judicial proceedings affecting future interests. The cases on the
valuation of future interests as between life tenant and remainderman
are helpful.
The foot notes are especially full and are made more helpful by the very
complete citation to articles and notes in the various law reviews. And
the work is further made valuable by its many citations to, and quotations
from, Holdworth, History of English Law.
We have often wondered why case books are so inadequately indexed.
We put this question recently to a group of property teachers, several of
whom had edited case books and the only answer we received was that too
good an index would be an illegitimate aid to the pupil. Which answer
seems to be based upon the assumption that case books are for class room
use only, an assumption which we tried to combat earlier in this review.
There may be an excuse for no index. There is certainly no excuse for an
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inadequate one. Now, for instance, any book by Powell, the young David
-who slew Goliath Gray on the question of Determinable Fees would surely
contain a rather complete discussion of the subject. Of course this book
contains plenty of cases and plenty of citations on the situations which
give rise to determinable fees. And yet one can not find Determinable
Fees either in the table of contents, or in the index. Of what value would
Smith's Leading Cases or Sharswood and Budd's Cases on Real Property be
without an adequate index? Our advice to the modern authors of case
books is "go thou and do likewise."
At the end of this rambling and more or less impressionistic review we
may summarize by saying that it seems to us that the subject has been
thoroughly and interestingly covered. Certainly, if any student, whether
in law school or elsewhere, will think his way through this book, he will
have a very thorough and a very practical view of the modern law of
future interests.
In his preface Powell says:
"The law of future interests has a long past, an active present, and
seems likely to acquire an ever-increasing importance as long as property
accumulations continue or increase and the human desire to devise property
and to create trusts exists."
The writer happens to be one of those who believe that the conditions that
are making for a more extensive creating of future interests is not, socially
speaking, a wholly desirable one. But if we are to have future interests, it
behooveth the lawyer to know something about the subject. And we kmow
of no better medium for acquiring this knowledge than this very excellent
ease book. And if a rank outsider may be permitted an opinion we venture
to say that this collection of cases will be found eminently teachable.
CHArLE C. WHITs.
The State as a Party Litigant. By Robert Dorsay Watkins. Baltimore,
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1927. pp. xvii, 207.
This is an excellent concise review of the present state of the law in the
United States, England and France, on the suability of the state by individ-
uals. Primarily the author sticks to the case-law, keeping the discussion
close to the ground. This is especially helpful as to the law in France.
It is difficult to judge any body of foreign law merely from the abstract
formulas which are used by native writers. We want to know just what
these mean as between a plaintiff and the defendant in actual occurrences.
This concrete knowledge of the actual working of the law in France brings
home to us undodgable conviction of the backwardness of English and
American law on this subject.
The author is not concerned with the distinction in this country between
the national state and our component commonwealths. Hence the reader
need not expect here a discussion of the 11th Amendment and the suability
of state officers, or how near the latter gives relief against a state in
some types of cases. In others it gives only a judgment against the officer
personally. Why is not the political community suable, where it chould be
responsible? That is the major thesis of the book, both in presenting the
existing law and criticizing it. Alucl, is said, too, as to what should be
fixed as the range of state responsibility, particularly in Chapter VII, The
1109 Ala. 528, 20 So. 370 (1895).
2 294 Ill. 488, 128 N. E. 518 (1920).
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United States as Defendant (Court of Claims) and Chapter X, Administra-
tive Law and State Responsibility in France.
Chapters I to IV inclusive cover the history of the doctrine of non-
suability in England, proceedings against the state in England, the poti-
tion of right, the state as plaintiff in England and suits against officers
in England. Chapters V to VIII inclusive cover in the same order the
corresponding topics in the United States. Perhaps the least currently
known matter is that presented in Chapter VI on the extent to which the
United States, when it consents to be sued, has a different standing from
that of a private defendant in an otherwise like case. Chapter IX discusses
state property in doiriestic courts of admiralty in England and in the
United States. In the latter the Public Vessels Act, Mar. 3, 1925, goes
far to concede the principle of national liability for tortious acts of national
officers committed in the course of their normal actions in carrying on the
government. The other chapters, not so far mentioned, are Chapter XI on
the state before foreign courts, and concluding Chapter XII in which the
theories of non-suability without consent are examined and some conclu-
sions offered.
The author emphasizes the inadequacy of a two hundred page treatise to
exhaust the topics embraced. He presents an excellent summary of deci-
sions, of doctrine, and of the leading contributions to theoryi-a well docu-
mented hand-book to guide any student to further study. Apart from the
value of stripping the old dogma that the "sovereign" cannot be sued with-
out his consent of its fictional supports so that legislators will become more
ready to grant consent to suits for torts as well as for other wrongs, It
seems to the reviewer a waste of time to deal with it in the hope that it
may be so far destroyed that courts will abandon it without legislation.
In point of theory, to the simple mind the dogma was shown to be utterly
without justification in a modern democratic state by Justice Wilson and
Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia., The latter said:
"It is agreed, that one free citizen may sue any number on whom process
can be conveniently executed; nay, in certain cases one citizen may, sue
forty thousand; for where a corporation is sued, all the members of it are
actually sued, though not personally sued. In this city [Philadelphia] there
are forty odd thousand free citizens, all of whom may be collectively sued
by an individual citizen. In the State of Delaware, there are fifty odd thous-
and free citizens * * * can the difference between forty odd thousand
and fifty odd thousand make any distinction as to right?"
Chief Justice Jay also called attention to the expectation that the now
Constitution would "promote justice."
In commending the book, let the review close with the author's quotation
from the opinion of the Court of Claims in Brown v. U. S.2:
"In the great arrogance of great ignorance, our popular orators and
writers have impressed upon the public mind the belief that in this repub-
lic of ours private rights receive unequalled protection from the govern-
ment; and some have actually pointed to the establishment of this court
as a sublime spectacle to be seen nowhere else on earth . . . f The sec-
tion allowing suits by aliens] has revealed the fact that the legal redress
given to a citizen of the United States against the United States is less than
he can have against almost any government in Christendom. The laws of
other nations have been produced and proved in this court, and the mortify-
ing fact is judicially established that the government of the United States
holds itself, of nearly all governments, the least amenable to law."
D. 0. McGOVNEY.
1 2 Dallas 419 (U. S. 1793).
2 6 Ct. C1. 171, 192 (U. S. 1870).
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Paul Vinogradoff-A Memoir. By the Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher. Oxford
University Press, American Branch, New York, 1927. pp. 74.
1
That memoirs of Sir Paul Vinogradoff should continue to appear is indic-
ative of the impression he made upon his contemporaries, especially upon
such as came in personal contact with him. As a scholar, as a teacher-he
was one of the greatest teachers in a university noted for its great teachers
-as a linguist who could speak and write with force and ditinction at
least twelve languages, Vinogradoff was internationally known to the world
of scholarship and learning. In this memoir, written by his fellow towns-
man and university colleague, we are introduced to the less generally well
known Vinogradoff the man. We are able to follow, in an unusually inti-
mate way and from the time when he was a schoolboy, this man who loved
music, art and people as well as books, and who travelled vwidely largely
for the sheer joy of it. As early as his student days at Moscow University
we find him noted for his brilliant scholarship and his liberal ideas in re-
gard to both politics and religion. To collect materials for a dissertation
for his master's degree he went to Italy where he "worked by day in the
Chapter Library with mild and scholarly Benedictines, and drank by night
in the Cafe with fire-eating red shirts." A few years later he is to b2
found "lying full length on the grass in the Parks at Oxford" converting
Maitland to the study of English legal history. His natural gifts overcame
the usual handicap of foreign birth and training. Genial, composed, charm-
ing in conversation he was a welcome guest in Oxford common-rooms and in
English homes even from the first, and long before he came permanently to
live in England. All these things and many more are related in this mem-
oir, which brings out the human and personal side of that cosmopolitan
Russian who in 1903 became Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, and settled
down in Oxford to win not only the approval but also the affection of that
conservative and critical community.
G. E. WODBnmE.
The Legal Aspects of Zoning. By Newman F. Baker. Chicago, The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1927. pp. xii, 132.
The writer discusses zoning under six chapter headings: (1) municipal
aesthetics and the law, (2) zoning legislation, (3) the zoning ordinance,
(4) the zoning board of appeals, (5) the legality of zoning, and (0) the
problem of the metropolitan area or region.
The more interesting and valuable parts of the book are the second,
third and fourth chapters. The others trace in broad outline the need for,
the rise of and the judicial attitude toward the establishment of the zoning
movement. They are largely descriptive, but well documented and exhibit
no little insight into underlying considerations. The cases are given in
digest form, without much attention to critical significance. The chapters
first mentioned, however, are constructive and suggestive; the ideas are
offered in the author's own words; and the treatment of legislative and
administrative policies is specific. The assembly of data is excellent. And
the references make available to the lawyer the best of the materials pro-
duced by non-legal consultants. The March, 1928, edition of the mimeo-
graphed pamphlets issued by the Department of Commerce should be used
as a supplement.,
It is the best book on the subject since the publication, six years ago,
of Williams, The Law. of City Planning and Zoning. Because Professor
Baker's work has been done more thoughtfully and with better organiza-
tion, and because he has recorded the output of legislation an& judicial
opinion as well as the improvements in zoning procedure during this im-
